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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. 
JASON EDWARD PAYNE, : Case No. 20000497-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah sentenced Defendant/Appellant Jason Payne 
("Appellant" or "Payne") and entered judgment of conviction for attempted possession of 
a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor. R. 31-32. A copy of the Judgment is in 
Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION 
Issue. Whether the trial judge violated due process, Appellant's right to appear 
and defend in person, and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 when he sentenced Appellant in absentia to 
the maximum sentence without affording defense counsel or the state an opportunity to 
speak to sentencing? 
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law which is reviewed for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
correctness. See State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996) (issue of whether 
defendant was properly sentenced in absentia involves a question of law). While a trial 
judge ordinarily has discretion in sentencing, that discretion is not unlimited. See State v. 
Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) (recognizing trial court exceeds its discretion 
where it fails to sentence based on reliable and relevant information, and reviewing the 
question of whether trial judge sentenced defendant based on reliable and relevant 
information as a question of law). Any underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear 
error. See generally State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) (factual findings are 
reviewed for clear error). 
Preservation. This issue was preserved at R. 49:1-3. A copy of the transcript of 
the sentencing hearing is in Addendum B. A copy of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law is in Addendum C. Alternatively, the failure to base the sentencing 
decision on relevant and reliable information and the failure to afford counsel the 
opportunity to speak at sentencing was plain error pursuant to Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071 
and Utah R. Crim. P. 22. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (plain 
error occurs where an error is obvious and prejudices the defendant). 
TEXT OF RELEVANT RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The text of the following rules and constitutional provision is in Addendum D: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(b); 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Const, art. I, § 12; 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 1, 2000, the state charged Payne with one count of unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. R. 2. Payne pled guilty to 
attempted possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, on February 10, 
2000. R. 10, 12-19. The case was set for sentencing on March 31, 2000. R. 25. Payne 
appeared for sentencing, but because he had not reported to Adult Probation and Parole 
("AP&P") in time for the preparation of a presentence report, the trial court rescheduled 
sentencing for May 5, 2000. R. 25. On May 5, 2000, the trial court sentenced Appellant 
in absentia. R. 31-32. On May 11, 2000, the trial court entered its "Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order." R. 33-35. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 10, 2000, Payne pled guilty to attempted possession of a controlled 
substance, a class A misdemeanor, before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno. R. 10. 
Although Payne waived time for sentencing, the state requested a presentence report. 
February 10, 2000 plea hearing at 3. Judge Uno ordered a presentence report and set 
sentencing for March 31, 2000 before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick. R. 10. Judge 
Uno did not tell Payne that he would be sentenced in absentia if he did not appear at 
sentencing. February 10, 2000 plea hearing. 
3 
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Payne, who was doing well with pretrial services, attending substance abuse 
classes and working two jobs, did not go to AP&P in time for a presentence report to be 
prepared for the March 31, 2000 sentencing. R. 48:3. Payne was in contact with AP&P 
two weeks prior to the March 31, 2000 sentencing date but was told that AP&P would not 
be able to complete a report by the date of sentencing. R. 48:3-4. Payne had scheduled 
an interview with AP&P for the week after the March 31, 2000 sentencing date. R. 48:3. 
Judge Frederick continued sentencing to May 5, 2000. R. 48:5. He told Payne not 
to fail to attend the meetings and to tell the presentence investigator that Appellant was in 
a "very precarious situation" and the report must be done by the time of sentencing. 
R. 48:5. Judge Frederick did not tell Payne that he would be sentenced in absentia if he 
did not appear at sentencing. R. 48. 
The day before Payne's April 6, 2000 date with AP&P, an agent called to confirm 
the appointment. R. 28. That agent spoke with a family member who indicated that 
Payne had not filled out the presentence packet. R. 28. The appointment was 
rescheduled for April 13, 2000. R. 28. After Payne did not appear at the April 13, 2000 
appointment, AP&P informed Judge Frederick that because Payne had not met with the 
agency, AP&P could not prepare a presentence report in time for the May 5, 2000 
sentencing. R. 28. 
Judge Frederick issued a warrant for Payne's arrest on May 3, 2000. R. 29. On 
May 5, 2000, Judge Frederick sentenced Payne in absentia to the maximum allowable 
4 
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sentence of one year. R. 31-32. Judge Frederick did not afford defense counsel or the 
prosecutor an opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of 
sentence. R. 49. Instead, Judge Frederick simply sentenced Payne to the maximum term 
without any input as to the appropriate sentence and without considering whether the 
public interest required that he proceed with sentencing in absentia. R. 49. On May 11, 
2000, Judge Frederick entered "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order." See 
Addendum C. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court violated due process and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 when it sentenced 
Payne in absentia to the maximum sentence without giving defense counsel or the 
prosecutor the opportunity to present information relevant to sentencing and without 
basing the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information. The error requires 
reversal as a matter of law. Moreover, the error was harmful since the record shows that 
Payne would have been a candidate for probation had the judge conducted a full 
sentencing hearing and based the sentencing determination on relevant and reliable 
information. 
The trial judge further violated due process, the Article I, section 12 right to appear 
and defend, and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 and abused his discretion in sentencing Payne in 
absentia. Payne was never informed that sentencing would proceed if he were not 
present. He therefore did not knowingly waive the right to presence. In addition, the 
5 
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judge did not fully consider whether the public interest required that Payne be sentenced 
in absentia. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT SENTENCED APPELLANT IN ABSENTIA TO THE 
MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE SENTENCE WITHOUT ANY INPUT 
FROM DEFENSE COUNSEL OR THE PROSECUTOR AS TO THE 
APPROPRIATE SENTENCE. 
At the sentencing, the trial judge indicated that he would proceed with sentencing 
even though Payne was not present, then asked defense counsel whether there was any 
legal reason other than the failure to appear to not sentence Payne. R. 49:3. The 
following exchange then occurred: 
Defense counsel: No, your Honor, except that I think it would violate his 
due process rights and his right according to Rule 22 of the Criminal Rules 
of Procedure, Judge, that he has a right to -
Judge Frederick: Yes, and I can appreciate your view about that, but I will 
determine at this point that's not going to delay the moving forward of the 
case. There being no reason, therefore, why the defendant should not be 
sentenced, it appears to this Court, based upon the record, that on the 31st of 
March of this year he entered a plea of guilty to a Class A misdemeanor 
crime of attempted possession of a controlled substance. He has thereafter 
failed to show at any of the Court ordered hearings or proceedings. 
Accordingly I will order that he serve the term provided by law in 
the Adult Detention Center for a period of one year. I will order that he be 
committed forthwith to that institution. 
R. 49:3-4. 
6 
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A. THE TRIAL JUDGE VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R. 
CRIM. P. 22 WHEN HE SENTENCED PAYNE WITHOUT 
CONSIDERING RELEVANT AND RELIABLE INFORMATION AND 
WITHOUT AFFORDING DEFENSE COUNSEL AND THE 
PROSECUTOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK TO SENTENCING. 
The state and federal due process clauses "require[] that a sentencing judge act on 
reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a sentence." 
State v. HowelL 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985); see also Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071 (state 
and federal due process protections applicable to sentencing proceedings require that 
judge make sentencing decision based on reliable and relevant information). A sentence 
which is not based on reliable and relevant information must be vacated. See State v. 
Cesarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1009 (Utah 1982) (vacating sentence where defendant was not 
supplied with a copy of the presentence report); Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071-75 (vacating 
sentence based on unreliable hearsay report). 
One of the ways in which courts attempt to effectuate the requirement that 
sentencing decisions be based on reliable and relevant information is to require that 
criminal defendants be given a copy of the presentence report prior to sentencing. 
HowelL 707 P.2d at 118. A defendant who has access to the presentence report can then 
challenge any inaccuracies, thereby "shor[ing] up the soundness and reliability of the 
factual basis upon which the judge must rely in the exercise of that sentencing 
discretion." Id. (quoting State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980)). Providing 
the presentence report to the defendant helps ensure that the sentencing judge exercises 
7 
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1 
his or her discretion based on accurate information which is known to the defendant. 
Cesarez. 656P.2dat 1007. 
Another way in which courts attempt to effectuate the due process requirement 
that sentencing decisions be based on reliable and relevant information is to preclude trial 
judges from relying on unreliable hearsay reports in assessing sentence. See Johnson, 
856 P.2d at 1071-73. Reliance on such unreliable hearsay reports results in an unfair 
sentencing hearing, in violation of due process. Id. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) further attempts to effectuate the due process requirement 
of a full and fair sentencing proceeding based on relevant and reliable information by 
requiring sentencing judges to give both the defendant and the prosecutor an opportunity 
to present any information which might be material to the sentence. Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(a) states in part: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should 
not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of 
sentence. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a); see Howell 707 P.2d at 118 ("[t]o ensure fairness in the 
sentencing procedure, [Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)] directs trial courts to hear evidence from 
both the defendant and the prosecution that is relevant to the sentence to be imposed"). 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22 allows a defendant to make an allocution statement at 
8 
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sentencing. See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 370-73 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J , 
concurring and dissenting) (joined by Stewart, J. and Zimmerman, J. in the result); see 
also Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111 (right to allocution at sentencing "is an inseparable part 
of the right to be present" guaranteed by Utah Const, art. I, § 12). In addition, since 
counsel acts as an advocate for a defendant, the language of this rule also requires that 
defense counsel be given the opportunity to make a statement and to present any 
information in mitigation. See generally Cesarez, 656 P.2d at 1007 ("[sentencing is a 
critical stage of a criminal proceeding at which a defendant is entitled to the effective 
assistance of counsel"). Allowing defense counsel to make such a statement and provide 
such information furthers the due process requirement of a fair and reliable sentencing 
proceeding in addition to ensuring that a defendant facing sentencing is afforded his Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. See id. 
In this case, the trial judge did not afford defense counsel the opportunity to make 
a statement regarding the appropriate sentence. Nor did the trial court allow defense 
counsel the opportunity to present any information in mitigation of sentence. Moreover, 
the trial judge did not give the prosecutor the opportunity to present any information 
material to the imposition of sentence. Instead, the trial judge simply reacted to the fact 
that Payne was not present for sentencing and immediately imposed the maximum 
sentence, apparently based solely on the fact that Payne was not present. 
By failing to afford defense counsel the opportunity to make a statement and 
9 
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i 
present mitigation and failing to ask the prosecutor for input, the trial judge violated Utah 
R. Crim P. 22(a). In addition, proceeding with sentencing without this required input left 
the trial court to impose sentence in a vacuum. Rather than conducting a fair sentencing 
proceeding in compliance with due process where relevant and reliable information 
formed the basis for the sentence, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence without 
obtaining any information about Payne other than the fact that he was not present at the 
sentencing hearing. Proceeding in this fashion without input from defense counsel or the 
prosecutor and without any information as to Payne's criminal record, if any, potential for 
rehabilitation and amenability to treatment, or any other factors pertinent to sentencing 
violated due process and Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). 
Moreover, the trial judge's sentencing decision was based in part on findings 
which were clearly erroneous. According to Judge Frederick, Payne pled guilty on 
March 31, 2000, and "has thereafter failed to show up at any of the Court ordered 
hearings and proceedings." R. 49:3. Payne actually pled guilty before Judge Uno on 
February 10, 2000. February 10, 2000 Plea Hearing. Payne appeared before Judge 
Frederick on March 31, 2000 for sentencing. R. 49. The judge rescheduled sentencing 
for May 5, 2000. R. 48:5. After the plea hearing, Payne was in contact with AP&P and 
scheduled an appointment. R. 48:3. He also apparently contacted AP&P after the 
March 31 hearing and scheduled an appointment. R. 28. AP&P rescheduled the 
appointment after contacting a family member rather than Payne. R. 28. Hence, Judge 
10 
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Frederick's finding that Payne had failed to show up at court ordered hearings or 
proceedings after he pled guilty is not supported by the facts in the record and is clearly 
erroneous. Judge Frederick abused his discretion in sentencing Payne to the maximum 
sentence based on this incorrect finding and in the absence of input from the parties or 
reliable information which was relevant to the sentencing determination. Because the 
sentence violated due process and the rules of criminal procedure, it must be vacated and 
the case remanded for a fair sentencing hearing. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071-75 
(vacating sentence which was based on an unreliable hearsay report). 
Defense counsel attempted to object to the sentencing proceeding, relying on due 
process and Utah R. Crim. P. 22. R. 49:3. In a situation such as this, where defense 
counsel referred to the relevant provisions and was then cut off by the judge, who 
proceeded with sentencing without giving counsel the opportunity to speak, the issue is 
preserved for appellate review. 
Should this Court disagree and determine that the issue is not preserved, it 
nevertheless is subject to review based on the plain error in sentencing which was 
committed by the trial judge. See generally State v. Morgan. 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 
(Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 
814 (1989)) (plain error occurs where the error is obvious and affects the substantial 
rights of the accused). Rule 22(a) plainly requires a trial judge to afford both defendant 
and the prosecutor the opportunity to speak. Johnson requires that sentencing decisions 
11 
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i 
be based on relevant and reliable information in order to meet due process requirements. 
Rule 22(a) and Johnson place the responsibility on the trial judge to make sure that a fair 
sentencing proceeding which meets these requirements occurs. The error in failing to 
afford defense counsel the opportunity to speak on behalf of her client and in otherwise 
failing to base the sentencing decision on reliable and relevant information from the 
prosecutor and defense counsel was obvious. 
While the failure to comply with due process requires a new sentencing hearing as 
a matter of law, a review for harm also demonstrates that the error in failing to afford 
defense counsel or the prosecutor the opportunity to speak and in failing to base the 
sentencing determination on relevant and reliable information was harmful. The trial 
judge sentenced Appellant to the maximum allowable sentence based only on the fact that 
he was not present at sentencing and the judge's erroneous finding that he had not 
appeared after the plea hearing. Payne was working two jobs and following the 
requirements for pretrial release through Pre-Trial Services. R. 48:3. He was attending 
LDS substance abuse classes and had obtained his high school diploma. R. 48:3. He had 
been in contact with AP&P to schedule his presentence interview, but was having 
difficulty meeting with AP&P because of his job responsibilities. R. 48:3. Nothing about 
the circumstances of the crime, simple possession of methamphetamine, suggest that a 
maximum sentence would be appropriate. Instead, the factors in the record suggest that 
Payne was a candidate for probation and treatment rather than the maximum sentence. 
12 
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Given the positive information about Payne in the record, failure to meet the requirements 
of due process and Rule 22(a) was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affected 
Payne's substantial rights. A new sentencing hearing is required. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH R. 
CRIM. P. 22 BY SENTENCING PAYNE IN ABSENTIA WHERE THE 
RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH THAT PAYNE KNOWINGLY AND 
VOLUNTARY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AND DEFEND 
AT SENTENCING. 
In addition to failing to comply with Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a) and due process in 
conducting the sentencing hearing without input from the parties, Judge Frederick also 
violated due process and Utah R. Crim. P. 22 when he sentenced Payne in absentia. Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22(b) states, "[o]n the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in 
defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by 
the court." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2) outlines the grounds for trial in a defendant's 
absence. It states in pertinent part: 
In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for 
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment 
entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been 
presentf.] 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2). 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Amendment, applicable 
to this prosecution through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, guarantee the 
13 
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right to be present at sentencing. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109-10; United States v. 
McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C. 1969). Any waiver of this right to be present 
"must be voluntary and involve an intentional relinquishment of a known right." 
Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110 (further citation omitted). The burden is on the state to 
establish waiver, and a knowing and voluntary waiver may not be presumed by the trial 
court. State v. Houtz, 714 P.2d 677, 678-79 (Utah 1986). 
In order to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to be present at sentencing, 
the defendant must, at the very least, be given notice of the proceedings. Anderson, 929 
P.2d at 1110. In addition, the directive given the defendant must provide sufficient 
warning that the hearing will proceed even if the defendant is not present for a knowing 
waiver of the right to presence to occur. McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1129-30. 
In Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111, the Supreme Court held that sentencing the 
defendant in absentia did not violate the defendant's right to allocution where the 
defendant was informed of the trial date and signed a written waiver of his right to be 
present at trial, then had no further contact with trial counsel and failed to appear at trial 
and sentencing. Id at 1110-11. The Court recognized that the right to allocution at 
sentencing "is an inseparable part of the right to be present" found in Article I, section 12 
of the Utah Constitution. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. Anderson waived that right to 
allocution by his voluntary absence after being informed of the trial date, his execution of 
a written waiver of his right to be present, his failure to appear at trial, and his failure to 
14 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
keep in touch with defense counsel or appear at sentencing. Id. at 1110-1111. 
The Utah Supreme Court relied on McPherson in reaching its conclusion that 
Anderson waived his right to be present. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. In McPherson, the 
court focused on the nature of the communication with the defendant in determining 
whether a defendant knowingly waived his right to be present at trial. McPherson, 421 
F.2d at 1129-30. The focus in determining waiver, then, is on whether the record 
demonstrates that the defendant knew that hearing would proceed in his absence. Id. The 
trial judge in McPherson made it clear that the defendant was to be present. LI at 1130. 
The McPherson court reasoned that although the defendant knew that serious 
consequences could occur if he did not appear, the record failed to demonstrate that the 
defendant knew that the trial would proceed without him if he were not present, and 
therefore failed to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to presence. IcL 
The focus in McPherson on whether the defendant knew the hearing would 
proceed regardless of whether he was present is consistent with Anderson, where the 
defendant knew that the trial would proceed without him since he "executed a written 
waiver of his right to be present." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. It is also consistent with 
other Utah case law which does not directly address the issue of whether a knowing 
waiver occurs when the defendant is not informed that the hearing will proceed in his 
absence. See e ^ Wagstaff, 772 P.2d at 989-991 (considering only whether the 
defendant's absence at trial was voluntary, and not analyzing whether a knowing waiver 
15 
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occurs where the record does not demonstrate that the defendant knew the hearing would 
proceed without him if he did not appear); State v. Myers. 508 P.2d 41, 42-43 (Utah { 
1973). 
In the present case, Payne was informed of the sentencing date. R. 48:5. In 
addition, Judge Frederick's attitude and words conveyed to Payne that serious 
consequences would occur if he did not keep his appointments with AP&P. R. 48:4-5. 
The record does not demonstrate, however, that Payne was informed that sentencing 
would proceed in his absence if he did not appear at sentencing. The serious 
consequences Payne faced could include several consequences other than sentencing in 
absentia, such as issuance of a bench warrant or sentencing without benefit of a 
presentence report. Reference to serious consequences therefore failed to inform Payne 
that he could be sentenced in absentia. See McPherson. 421 F.2d at 1130. Thus, the 
record fails to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of the due process and Article I, 
section 12 right to be present at sentencing. 
The Supreme Court in Anderson indicated that "[practical considerations also 
mitigate[d] in favor of in absentia sentencing" in that case. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. 
The Court's concern was that the defendant could absent himself for years "and the 
eventual sentencing would have to be performed by a judge who was unfamiliar with the 
case and had no access to relevant information." IdL In this case, the sentencing judge 
did not accept the plea and did not allow the defense or prosecution to present relevant 
16 
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information. A concern that the defendant would eventually be sentenced by a judge who 
knew nothing about the case is nonsensical in this case where the actual sentencing was 
conducted by a judge who had not taken the plea and knew very little about the case. 
Moreover, any concern about dilatory defendants who are attempting to delay the 
administration of justice by failing to appear at a hearing is remedied by requiring trial 
judges to exercise their discretion to proceed in absentia by balancing "the public interest 
in proceeding" without the defendant against the defendant's interests in being present. 
See Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999), cert, denied, 120 S.Ct. 200, 145 
L.Ed.2d 168; see also United States v. Fontanez. 878 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1989) (court 
considers not only whether waiver of right to presence was knowing and voluntary, but 
also whether trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the public interest in 
proceeding without the defendant outweighed the defendant's interest in being present); 
People v. Parker. 57 N.Y.2d 136, 140-42, 440 N.E.2d 1313, 454 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1982) 
("trial court must exercise its sound discretion upon consideration of all appropriate 
factors"). Requiring trial courts to balance the public interest in proceeding against the 
defendant's interest in being present ensures that trial courts "vigorously safeguard" the 
right to presence. Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 36. The factors to be considered when balancing 
such interests include "the possibility that [the] defendant could be located within a 
reasonable period of time," the difficulty of rescheduling, and the burden on the state in 
not proceeding. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d at 142; Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 36. 
17 
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In this case, the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Payne in absentia 
where the record fails to demonstrate that the public interest in proceeding outweighed 
Payne's interest in being present. Payne lived with his grandmother for twelve years at an 
address in West Valley City. R. 7. He had the same job for five years. R. 7. Had the 
trial judge continued the sentencing hearing rather than sentencing Payne in absentia, 
there was a reasonable possibility in light of this information that Payne could be located 
within a reasonable amount of time and brought in for sentencing. This is evidenced by 
the fact that Payne is currently serving this sentence at the Salt Lake County Adult 
Detention Complex. 
The sentencing hearing in all likelihood could have been easily rescheduled. 
Sentencing hearings do not require much time. The sentencing judge has regular 
calendars for sentencings and could include one more hearing on such a calendar. In 
addition, since neither the state nor the defense presented any information in regard to 
sentencing, a delay in sentencing would not burden the state or create a risk that 
information would be lost. Since the public interest did not require immediate sentencing 
in this case, Payne's interest in being present outweighed any public interest in 
proceeding. The trial judge therefore abused his discretion in sentencing Payne in 
absentia. 
18 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Jason Edward Payne respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate his sentence and remand his case for a full and fair sentencing proceeding. 
SUBMITTED this J?Z~JL day of September, 2000. 
CdvA e. ate/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
ANDREA J. GARLAND 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered the original ( 
and seven copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 
5th Floor, P. 0. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to the 
Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, 
P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this ZSL^- day of September, 2000. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office as indicated above this day of September, 2000. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JASON EDWARD PAYNE, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Pre-Trial Services 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001902000 FS 
Judge: .J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: May 5, 2000 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cindyb. 
Prosecutor: NIELSEN, MATTHEW G. 
Defendant not present 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARLAND, ANDREA 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 20, 1973 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 8:46-8:49 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) -
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/10/2000 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE 
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s) 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
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Case No: 001902000 
Date: May 05, 2000 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
The Court finds the defendant has voluntarily absented himself from 
these proceedings and sentences the defendant in absentia. Counsel 
for State to prepare the findings of fact conclusions of law and 
order re absentia. 
Dated this & day of 
T-N-.~-.-N O /"!-=» r-i-H \ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM B 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
o \ ^ % ^  X^ \ J JUN 1 6 i 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ORIGINAL 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. (Case No. 001902000 
JASON EDWARD PAYNE, 
Defendant. 
Hearing 
Electronically recorded on 
May 5, 2000 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Third District Court Judge 
APPEARANCES: 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
MATTHEW J. NIELSEN 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)468-2685 
ANDREA GARLAND 
Salt Lake Legal Defenders 
424 East 500 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-5444 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, RPR/CSR/CCT 
1771 South California Avenue 
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Clerk of the Court 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on May 5, 2000) 
MS. GARLAND: Good morning, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
MS. GARLAND: Andrea Garland on behalf of Jason Payne. 
He's No. 15 on your calendar. 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Jason Edward Payne, 
case No. CR002000. Ms. Garland, you are appearing on behalf of 
the defendant, Mr. Payne. He's not with us, apparently. 
MS. GARLAND: I've not seen him, your Honor. I've not 
heard from him. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nielsen, are you here for the State? 
MR. NIELSEN: I am, your Honor. 
THE COURT: A warrant has been previously issued for 
Mr. Payne. However, given the circumstance that you've had no 
contact with him, this Court has had no contact with him, I am 
assuming that his failure to appear here today is a voluntary 
happenstance. 
MS. GARLAND: Since I haven't heard from him, we can't 
really draw that conclusion, Judge. 
THE COURT: Well, but we can in the interim, until I'm 
persuaded to the contrary. The fact that the defendant entered 
a plea of guilty on the 31st of March and was told both orally 
and in writing to be here on today's date for sentencing, and 
to contact AP&P for the obtaining of a presentence report, with 
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no further word from him in the interim, leads me to conclude 
that he has not chosen to comply with the terms of this Court's 
order and another Court's order. I will therefore proceed with 
the sentencing. 
Other than his failure to appear, Ms. Garland, do 
you have a legal reason as to why the defendant should not be 
sentenced today? 
MS. GARLAND: No, your Honor, except that I think it 
would violate his due process rights and his right according to 
Rule 22 of the Criminal Rules of Procedure, Judge, that he has 
a right to — 
THE COURT: Yes, and I can appreciate your view about 
that, but I will determine at this point that's not going to 
delay the moving forward of the case. 
There being no reason, therefore, why the defendant 
should not be sentenced, it appears to this Court, based upon 
the record, that on the 31st of March of this year he entered 
a plea of guilty to a Class A misdemeanor crime of attempted 
possession of a controlled substance. He has thereafter failed 
to show at any of the Court ordered hearings and proceedings. 
Accordingly I will order that he serve the term 
provided by law in the Adult Detention Center for a period of 
one year. I will order that he be committed forthwith to that 
institution. 
Mr. Nielsen, you prepare the appropriate findings of 
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fact, conclusions of law and order of voluntary absence. 
MR. NIELSEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Garland. 
MS. GARLAND: Thank you, your Honor. That's all that I 
have before you this morning. May I be excused? 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. Thank you. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH '"') —"*" 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my 
direction from the transmitter records made of these 
meetings. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and 
contains all of the evidence and all matters to which the 
same related which were audible through said recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore, the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 12th day of June 
2000. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2004 ^ _ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Utah County 
y^SSSNw 
VL^'yfLrf^ 
BEVERLY A. LOWE 1 
NOTMYPUBUC'STATEofUTJIH 
1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVE. 
PROVO, UT 84606 
COMM. EXP 2-24-2004 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
MATTHEW G. NIELSEN (7267) 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JASON EDWARD PAYNE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 




The above-entitled case came before this Court for sentencing on May 5, 2000. The State 
of Utah was represented by its counsel, David E. Yocom and Matthew G. Nielsen, and the 
defendant, who was not present, was represented by Andrea Garland. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On February 10, 2000, defendant entered a guilty plea in the above entitled-matter to 
Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, before Judge Roger A. 
Livingston. Defendant was referred to AP&P for a pre-sentence report. On March 31, 2000, 
defendant, who was out of custody, appeared personally before this Court for sentencing with his 
counsel, Andrea Garland. No pre-sentence report had been prepared so defendant was referred 
back to AP&P and personally given a new sentencing date of May 5, 2000. On May 5th 
n
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defendant once again failed to obtain a pre-sentence report and voluntarily failed to appear 
before this Court for sentencing 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-~ 
Rule 22 specifically states, "On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in 
defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(b). Because defendant and his counsel were both given personal notice of the May 
5th sentencing and defendant failed to appear for his pre-sentence report and voluntarily failed to 
appear for his sentencing, defendant is hereby sentenced in his absence. Furthermore, defendant 
has waived any right to be present by his voluntary absence after being given personal notice. 
ORDER 
Based on defendant's voluntary absence, defendant is hereby sentenced in abstentia for 
the offense of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, to the 
following: One year in the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Complex, forthwith. 
DATED this )|>ciay of May 2000. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the j( day of May 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to be mailed to LDA, Attorney for 
Defendant, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 17. The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally present at the trial 
with the following exceptions: 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the defendant's 
voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial 
shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present; 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material, to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec, 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
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